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Readers should note that doing so 
requires us to maintain both a sufficient 
number of uniformed armed forces 
personnel and a treasury sufficient to 
fund both military operations involving 
soldiers conducting extended combat 
operations anywhere in the world and 
the significant expense of hiring private 
military contractors to perform the sup-
port services necessary to enable them� 
This economic model, while currently 
feasible and tenable for the United States 
as a wealthy nation, may not work for 
another nation with more-constrained 
resources� In the future, while the 
“demand” may be there and the “sup-
ply” of contractors may still exist, if 
a nation does not have the financial 
resources to pay for those contracted 
services, this model might not work�
Outsourcing Security is a valuable 
read for military and civilian de-
fense professionals� Stanley applies 
a thoughtful analysis to what many 
may have thought they understood, 
and his work brings both depth 
and academic merit to the topic�
NEAL H� BRALLEY
Success and Failure in Limited War: Information 
& Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf 
& Iraq Wars, by Spencer D� Bakich� Chicago: 
Univ� of Chicago Press, 2014� 344 pages� $35 
(paperback)�
This groundbreaking treatise by Dr� 
Spencer Bakich, visiting lecturer in 
political science at the University 
of Richmond, endeavors to explain 
America’s mixed success with limited 
war since 1950 by way of a new theo-
retical approach to analyzing policy-
strategy formulation and execution at 
the highest levels of government� For the 
purposes of his theory, Bakich char-
acterizes limited wars as those fought 
at a high level of intensity for limited 
aims but whose outcomes “are of a 
considerable consequence for the states 
involved and for the broader interna-
tional system�” Furthermore, restraint 
is necessary to avoid escalation—a 
tendency of limited wars� Not surpris-
ingly, Bakich focuses his analysis on 
four preeminent case studies from the 
“American century”: the Korean War; 
the Vietnam War; the Persian Gulf War 
(Operation DESERT STORM); and the 
Iraq war (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM)�
The book’s first two chapters are largely 
theoretical� Bakich points out how estab-
lished approaches such as “rationalistic 
strategic choice theory” and the “foreign 
policy decision making (FPDM) school” 
cannot fully explain how information 
influences strategy, or its outcome, 
in war� He argues that organizational 
theory does not capture the true nature 
of relationships between strategic 
leaders and national security organiza-
tions� As Bakich writes, “A gap remains 
in our understanding of the sources 
of strategic success in [limited] war�”
To bridge this gap, Bakich confidently 
posits his “information institutions” 
approach� Simply put, it is the pattern 
of information flow between those at 
the apex of power and their national 
security organizations that predisposes 
states to success or failure in limited war� 
The information institutions approach 
suggests that top decision makers served 
by an information-rich and densely 
networked national security appara-
tus should have a better grasp of the 
strategic environment and experience 
greater military-diplomatic coordination 
in planning and execution, significantly 
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enhancing the effectiveness of their 
limited-war strategies� Bakich carefully 
explains the methodology used to test 
his theory and introduces two direct 
competitors: organizational culture 
theory and democratic civil-military re-
lations theory� Key propositions on stra-
tegic performance are also tabulated to 
test each of the three theories against the 
empirical data (the four case studies)�
In the next four chapters, Bakich 
convincingly demonstrates how only 
the information institutions approach 
correctly predicts (or explains) both 
the military and diplomatic strategic 
outcomes in all four limited-war cases, 
with the competing theories falling short 
in one way or another� For example, 
in the Persian Gulf War, defeating 
the Iraqi army without fracturing the 
international coalition defined strate-
gic success for the United States� The 
information institutions approach alone 
correctly anticipates military and diplo-
matic success in the Persian Gulf War� 
Organizational culture theory expects 
both military and diplomatic failure 
(given the extant organizational culture 
characterized by a military-dominant 
conception of war and a Jominian norm 
of civil-military relations), whereas 
democratic civil-military relations 
theory forecasts military success but 
diplomatic failure (given divergent 
military and diplomatic strategic prefer-
ences)� The book’s final chapter nicely 
encapsulates the results of the aforemen-
tioned analyses and their significance 
for theory and policy� One finishes the 
book persuaded that the information 
institutions approach offers a more 
satisfactory explanation for America’s 
mixed military and diplomatic results 
in limited war than do the alternatives�
Interestingly, Bakich’s emphasis on insti-
tutional as opposed to organizational re-
lationships in ascertaining the pertinent 
information flows reveals the often- 
disproportionate influence of key 
individuals in the decision-making 
process� In the Korean War, MacArthur’s 
near stranglehold on strategic intel-
ligence available to top policy makers 
was abetted by John Allison (in charge 
of the Department of State’s Office 
of Northeast Asian Affairs) arguing 
for American intervention north of 
the thirty-eighth parallel, against the 
advice of State’s own Policy Planning 
Staff—with disastrous results� In the 
Persian Gulf War, President George H� 
W� Bush’s personal, “hands-on” ap-
proach to information gathering, down 
to the analyst and desk-officer level, 
was tempered by National Security 
Adviser Brent Scowcroft’s and his deputy 
Robert Gates’s deft management of the 
interagency process� These and other 
anecdotes will keep the reader engaged 
and enthusiastic about the book�
With over eight hundred endnotes 
gleaned from more than four hundred 
authoritative sources, this is first and 
foremost a scholarly work� Those in 
the international relations community 
seeking to understand the puzzle of 
America’s recent strategic performance 
in limited wars will find this information 
institutions approach a worthy adjunct 
to the more established theories� Those 
who read purely for pleasure will enjoy 
the four case studies, each offering a 
unique take on the various policies and 
strategies crafted and the decisions made 
at the highest levels of government� In 
short, the book has much to offer, to 
the serious reader and dilettante alike�
DERRILL T� GOLDIZEN
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